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Abstract 
The equality between factor pay and marginal product is a major component of the 
neoclassical paradigm. The paper begins with a brief historical review of this principle. 
Follows a questioning about the relevance of this law as an argument in the social 
debates: does marginal product represent the very contribution of the agent and if so, is 
it a legitimate reference for the setting of remuneration? Our answer to the first part of 
the question is irresolute; to the second, it is negative. 
 
But most of the article is devoted to analysing the economic realism of the said law, 
both empirically and theoretically. We review some statistical studies present in the 
literature, with particular attention for the debate regarding the regressions of Cobb and 
Douglas. Evidence does not strengthen the neoclassical law of retribution. 
 
The paper analyses the factors that hinder either the determinateness of marginal 
product or the equalisation between it and factor's remuneration. Are analysed: 
- the restrictions inherent in the law of marginal productivity: constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition 
- an alternative explanation of interest: the Austrian theory 
- incentive wage theories: efficiency wage and tournament theory. 
 
The article then considers the particular case of the CEO's remuneration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Distribution of income is a sensitive subject, covering economic and social issues.  In 
political economy, the general theories of distribution are not legion. Various 
explanations concern some specific aspects of wage, interest, rent or profit. Among 
general explanations, one has emerged, the theory of marginal productivity, pillar of 
neoclassical economics. This theory has buried the earlier explanations of classical 
economists and it seems to have dried up the inspiration of possible alternatives. The 
purpose of this article is to assess its relevance by identifying the economic facts likely 
to thwart its action. 
 
Before getting into the subject, let's take a quick look at the teachings of the classics. 
Smith confusingly determines the value of a commodity from the amount of work 
incorporated; afterwards he considers that this value is obtained by adding rent, profit 
and wage, without explaining how these two operations lead to a single result. He 
gives separate explanations of the natural levels of remuneration of the three factors, 
which remain superficial. Ricardo constructs a more coherent theory that unites 
product value and factor remuneration through a rent theory that makes it an 
adjustment variable. As the price of wheat must allow all producers to be profitable, it 
equals the cost of production on the least fertile land, leaving a surplus profit to the 
infra-marginal farms, captured by the landowner in the form of land rent. Distribution 
between wages and profits is also rationalised by becoming a zero sum game. But his 
explanation relies by a great deal on the apocalyptic view of population growth of 
Malthus, a theory today widely discredited. 
 
Marx follows on Ricardo’s heels; here the distribution between wage and profit is 
analysed more finely. Labour being a commodity capable of producing more than its 
value, the capitalist who exploits it gets a gain which is the substance of its profit. 
Labour’s value is the cost of production of the goods required for keeping the worker 
in life and supplying labour. But what are the necessary goods? Those who ensure 
survival?  or well-being ? The normal standard of living of the worker is not defined; 
the rate of surplus-value therefore remains unexplained although analysed at length. 
Marxist theory has another weakness: whatever Marx says, the theory of the 
equalisation of the rate of profit, which he brings after having exposed the exploitation 
of labour, renders the theory of surplus value superfluous. 
 
The book “Production of commodities by commodities” (1960) of Sraffa reformulates 
the Ricardian theory in a more rigorous and formal way. Sraffa proves the existence of 
a general equilibrium of the economy where each sector yields the same rate of profit 
and where product prices equal their costs of production while the remuneration of 
factors is determined beforehand, again within the framework of a zero sum game. An 
essential characteristic of this model is that one of the two variables, wage or profit, 
must be exogenous, the other being endogenous. This amounts to deny that economics 
alone can explain distribution; non-economic considerations should interfere. 
* 
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The theory of marginal productivity achieves the tour de force of determining precisely 
all remunerations by means of a single law which resorts to exclusively economic 
factors, hence the aura it enjoys among economists. 
 
Consider a set of economic agents that cooperate in a production.  Let us classify them 
into some relatively homogeneous groups that we call factors of production. The 
potential size of these groups depends on natural or historical availability and 
constitutes the factor's supply. Factors’ demand is the doing of entrepreneurs;  it 
obviously depends on their productivity.  But the productivity of the agents in a group 
depends on the size of the group.  The more numerous it is, the less unit productivity 
will be. Marginal productivity of a factor is the supplement of product due to the fact 
that its size is n agents and not n - 1. It is decreasing, because if one group of agents 
increases while the others remain constant, its members will individually have 
available a smaller amount of the other factors. Suppose then that the prices of the 
different factors and of the product are given; the entrepreneur maximises his profit by 
hiring from each of them the number for which its marginal product value1 equals its 
price. This behaviour is rational: if he employed a smaller volume, the entrepreneur 
could increase his profit by increasing the recruitment; if he employed a larger number, 
the agents would pay him less than they cost him. 
 
Given the interplay of supply and demand, under the assumption of competitive 
markets, we must infer from the above that a factor’s remuneration necessarily equals 
the value of its marginal product. This does not mean that marginal productivity 
determines the factor’s price.  Endogenous determination of factor remuneration can 
be obtained only in the context of a system of simultaneous equations manipulating all 
the prices and quantities of the economy; the marginal productivity of a factor and its 
remuneration are then mutually determined. Nevertheless, according to this theory, we 
are all supposed to be paid depending on our productivity. Since we postulate the 
quasi-homogeneity of the factors, all the units have the same individual productivity, 
determined by the size of the workforce2.  
 
Based entirely on the rationality of agents, this theory has the appearance of evidence. 
After a historical note, this paper wonders about the social and the economic meaning 
of marginal productivity. Afterwards, it reviews the difficulties linked with the theory. 
In the following of the article, the theory that equates remuneration and marginal 
product value will simply be called "the law". 
 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE: THE ORIGIN 
The purpose of this section is not to go back to precursors, but to see how the early 
neoclassical theory formulated the law and made it one of its pillars. It was in 1889 
that the law was first expressed in fullness and clarity, by John Bates Clark, who was 
its most tenacious promoter. But in 1894 it received a choice support, with the 
                                                          
1
 The said value is the marginal product multiplied by the selling price of the product 
2
 It is therefore not necessary that the quality of the units recruited decreases progressively like 
the fertility of the lands cultivated in Ricardo. Wicksteed distinguishes the DESCRIPTIVE marginal 
productivity curve where the quality of the units decreases on the abscissa and the FUNCTIONAL 
marginal productivity curve whose ordinate is a pure function of the quantity on the abscissa. 
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inauguration by Philip Wicksteed of the famous production function, in "An Essay on 
the Coordination of the Laws of Distribution": 
P = F(A,B,C…K…N)      (1) 
The quantity produced (P) is a function F of the quantities used of each of the n factors 
of production.  Let the variables A, B ... K ... N represent these quantities3.  The 
underlying idea is to establish between the quantity produced on the one hand and that 
of the inputs on the other hand a mathematical relation that can be put in the form of an 
equation.  
 
F is a multivariate function.  It is obvious that its partial derivatives give the variation 
of P generated by a marginal variation of the only quantity of the factor considered.    
They correspond to the marginal productivity of the factors. We can therefore 
designate the marginal product of a factor called K by the mathematical notation of the 
partial derivative ∂P/∂K or FK. 
  
If factor K units are all remunerated for their marginal product, we have: 


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=
 
total
 
remuneration of K     (2) 
  
The validity of the law implies that the sum of the remunerations calculated this way 
equals the quantity produced to be distributed. This problem is known as the product 
exhaustion. The equation of product exhaustion is: 
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Wicksteed brings a long mathematical proof of this equality, but an important 
assumption is required : the returns to scale must be constant.  The mathematical 
terminology says that function F is homogeneous of degree one, which, 
mathematically, is expressed like this: 
if P = F(A,B,C), then :  m.P = F(m.A, m.B, m.C)  (4) 
where m is any constant 
 
Wicksteed analyses this condition: Is it realistic?  His answer is built as follows: 
1. He does not doubt that the physical product is a homogeneous function of degree 
one of the inputs. He seems to ignore Marshall's careful analysis of returns to scale 
at the same period. 
2. But when P is no longer a simple physical quantity but the producer’s income, the 
production function is homogeneous only if the elasticity of the demand for the 
product is infinite, which excludes monopolies. Finally, Wicksteed concludes: “the 
proposition is approximately true for small increments” (1932 p.36). 
 
In the “Lectures on Political Economy” (1901), Knut Wicksell takes over Wicksteed’s 
problem and brings the solution learned by generations of economists. He writes: “The 
scale on which an enterprise operates nearly always  has some influence on its average 
product (…) as a rule the best returns are obtained  at some particular scale of 
operation for the firm in question ; if this is exceeded, the advantages of centralization 
                                                          
3
 For ease, I use the same letters to "label" the factors and to express the amount that is used. 
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are outweighed by the increased costs (…) This scale of operation is, under the given 
circumstances, the ‘optimum’ towards which the firm must always, economically 
speaking, gravitate: and as it lies at the point of transition from ‘increasing’ to 
‘diminishing returns’ (relatively to the scale of production) the firm will conform to the 
law of constant returns” (1934 p.129). It should be noted, however, that the U-shape of 
the long-term average cost curve has been subjected to much criticism. 
 
Wicksell also shows that in increasing returns to scale, the right-hand side of equation 
(3) is greater than the left-hand side and the inverse is true in decreasing scale-returns. 
 
There is a difference in point of view between Clark and Wicksteed. For Wicksteed, 
there are a multitude of factors involved in the production function, from the types of 
human work to capital goods or natural goods. His conception is microeconomic. 
Clark always gives his examples with two factors of production: labour and capital; 
and he considers the economy as a whole, which he justifies by the levelling of 
marginal productivity through the whole economy by competition4. Clark sees capital 
as the permanent fund embodied in what he calls "capital goods", while these 
constitute the inputs of the production function of Wicksteed. Speaking of factor K, 
representative in equations (1) and (2), the latter writes : « Or K may be pick-axes, or 
any kind of machinery or tools (…) Observe too that it involves no pooling of unlike 
elements, and no expression of those unlike elements under a conventional unit, such 
as the £ sterling, and no artificial grouping of different factors of production. Each 
factor is expressed in its own unit and treated as having its independent influence, at 
the margin, on the increment or decrement of the product” (1932 p.13). 
 
The article “A Theory of Production” (1928) by economist Paul Douglas and 
mathematician Charles Cobb combines both points of view. The production function 
remains the central part, but it applies to the global economy and has only two inputs: 
capital and labour.  So was born the aggregate production function. The authors give 
the production function the form (previously designed by Wicksell): 
P = b.Kα.Lβ        (5) 
Their purpose is to prove that marginal productivity theory correctly explains the 
distribution of income in the real economy. Assuming product exhaustion (α+β = 1), 
the authors carry out an econometric analysis of US industrial statistics  from 1899 to 
1922, more precisely the annual indices of the variables studied. 
 
Function (5) has properties that make it perfectly suited to this analysis. On the one 
hand, the homogeneity of this function is easy to manage. On the other hand, its 
parameters are empirically observable data: α and β correspond to the respective 
relative shares of factors K and L in product P5. 
 
By the least squares method, equation (5) becomes: 
P = 1,01. K1/4 .L3/4.       (6) 
                                                          
4
 Employment of the factor increases in firms where it is more productive and decreases in firms 
where it is less productive. This process leads to an equalisation of marginal productivity of each 
factor. 
5
 The equalities α=(K.∂P/∂K)/P and β=(L.∂P/∂L)/P are obtained from some manipulations on 
partial derivative. 
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Global payroll is worth 3/4 of national income and the marginal productivity of labour 
is equal to 0,75P/L. The good correlation between the index of P calculated using 
equation (6) and the index of real output allows Cobb and Douglas to conclude that the 
theory of marginal productivity is valid; they must, however, recognise that the 
correlation between the observed wage indices and the calculated marginal 
productivity of labour is rather low, which does not seems to upset their optimism.  An 
additional reason for satisfaction: other statistical studies confirm the share of 3/4 
going to labour. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE : FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
An important step is the publication of "The Economics of Imperfect Competition” 
(1933) by Joan Robinson. This monumental and impressive work innovates in that it 
deals in a uniform and coherent way with perfect competition and imperfect 
competition as particular cases of the same general rule, both on the product market 
and on the factors markets. To this end, the analysis offers a range of linked concepts: 
- The marginal physical product and the value of the marginal physical product, 
concepts already known, are here determined on the basis of a constant expenditure 
allocated to the other factors of production. 
- The term marginal product is reserved for the marginal physical product 
multiplied by the marginal revenue.  
- The marginal net product, unlike the marginal product, supposes that the quantity 
of other factors was adapted so as to keep it optimal. It equals the difference 
between the variation of total revenue and the variation of total cost ensuing6. This 
concept was already present - but rather inaccurately – in the earlier Cantabridgians 
Marshall and Pigou. 
- The average cost of a factor is his unit pay (for example, hourly wage); the 
marginal cost of the factor is the extra cost of hiring an additional factor unit. 
These two variables7 reflect the factor's supply within the firm ; they coincide 
when this supply is perfectly elastic. 
 
The well-known rule for maximising profit is to equalise the marginal revenue with the 
marginal cost of the product. Robinson brings a new rule that leads to the same result: 
equalisation of the net marginal product of factors with their marginal cost8. 
 
The Paretian revival in the thirties does not revolutionise marginal productivity theory.  
The marginal rate of technical substitution between two factors brings nothing new 
since it simply equals the ratio between their marginal products. But the production 
function does not lose its audience, as the works of Hotelling and Samuelson attest. 
 
A chapter of the “Foundations of Economic Analysis” of Samuelson (1947) rewrites 
some grand principles of Robinson's Theory on the basis of the production function, a 
tool she had completely ignored.  Noting that many authors simplify outrageously the 
                                                          
6
 Robinson shows that for the enterprise that controls and optimises the inputs, net marginal 
product and marginal product are the same. But this equality not necessarily obtains at the 
aggregate level. 
7
 Average and marginal costs of the factor should not be confused with average and marginal 
costs of the quantity produced. 
8
 “Full equilibrium", that is absence of pure profit because of competition in the industry, implies 
moreover the equality between average net product and average factor cost. 
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issue of product exhaustion and the annihilation of profit, Samuelson clarifies: “it 
should be reasonably clear that this cannot be determined by the properties of the 
production function alone, but must depend upon the marketing situation of the firm, 
which in turn depends on the competition of other firms. It is quite clear that as far as 
the single firm is concerned it is possible that it be making huge profits regardless of 
the homogeneity of the production function. This condition is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the exhaustion of the product. If the production function were 
homogeneous, but demand were sufficiently favorable, of course product would not be 
exhausted- even under pure competition” (1966 p.83). 
 
The neowalrasian wave of the post-war period seriously changes the way 
microeconomic theories are presented. But the crux remains. As Malinvaud has shown, 
to define a set of feasible outputs is tantamount to determining a coherent 
technological relationship between the inputs and the outputs of each activity vector.  
The production function is therefore underlying. 
 
In its Paretian and neowalrasian versions, neoclassical theory outlines a general 
equilibrium. But Robinson's system is also, implicitly, an almost general equilibrium.  
The parameters related to the product market and to the inputs markets are indissolubly 
mixed.  Robinson's method, however, remains that of partial equilibrium. Everything 
is linked with everything, but the mechanisms are analysed one by one. The risk is then 
to obtain a dubious general equilibrium. The NET marginal product assumes that the 
remunerations of other factors are determined beforehand.  Robinson does not explain 
how she avoids the trap of circular reasoning9. This difficulty is likely to be solved 
within the framework of a system of simultaneous equations, but the partial 
equilibrium method prevents demonstrating that the problem has a solution. 
 
It follows that the law is an indispensable part in the whole formed by the general 
neoclassical equilibrium; this one cannot do without it. An alternative theory of 
retribution is possible only within a fundamentally different paradigm, for example 
that of the full cost pricing developed during the marginalist controversy from 1939 to 
the end of the fifties. 
 
ETHICAL MEANING OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY 
At this point, we have at our disposal a completely refined definition of marginal 
productivity, a pure abstraction, which holds in a simple mathematical formula: ∂P/∂K, 
considering the volume K of factor K. Is it possible to give it a more concrete content? 
 
It is fairly widely understood that marginal productivity is interpretable as the 
contribution of agents participating in social production.  The competitive equilibrium 
leads to paying the economic agents in proportion to their contribution.  The main 
promoter of this idea is Clark himself.  According to him, the theory of production and 
that of distribution join together. The theory traces in production the origin of shares 
                                                          
9
 Marshall refutes that the application of the law to the factor labour constitutes in itself a theory 
of wages, “since in order to estimate net product of his work, we have to take for granted all the 
expenses of production of the commodity on which he works, other than his own wage”.  Further 
on, about interest, he adds: “They cannot be made into a theory of interest, any more than into a 
theory of wages without reasoning in a circle” ‘(1920 pp.518-519). 
- 8    - 
 
distributed to agents, despite the fact that social institutions hide the natural law behind 
bargaining processes: “The entire study of distribution is in this view a study of 
specific production. It is an analysis of the wealth-creating operation, and a tracing to 
each of the three10 agencies that together bring wealth into existence of the part which 
it separately contributes to the joint result” (1908 p.12). 
 
Going even further, he concludes to the legitimacy of the social system that 
remunerates the factors on this basis. He does not conceal his ideological 
preoccupation:  "The right of Society to exist in its present form, and the probability 
that it will contribute to exist, are at stake" (1908 p.12). Clark even claims that his law 
provides the reason for not being socialist. 
 
Clark then considers the question of whether to give each one the equivalent of his 
product is a fair rule and answers: "The entire question whether it is just or not lies 
outside  our  inquiry, for it is a matter of pure ethics. Before us, on the other hand, is a 
problem of economic fact" (1908 p.14). This statement is quite contradictory with the 
multiple allusions to the legitimacy of this distribution. Admittedly, the word “merit” 
does not appear in his text.  Clark, however, approaches a moralising conception.  This 
is evidenced by his insistence on the concept of abstinence to characterise saving. In 
the controversy between the two men, Böhm Bawerk challenged the relevance of this 
concept, giving the example of the almost automatic saving of very rich persons.  
Clark retorted: "By extending the lines of railroad he owns, the multi-millionaire 
denies himself the enlarging of his palatial residences" (1895 p.98). 
 
Clark seems to be the great economist who has gone the farthest on this path that could 
be described as justificatory. Other neoclassical economists generally distinguish 
contribution and merit.  Here are two examples that both bring a close and powerful 
argument: 
- Frank Knight : “The income doesn’t go to factors but to their owners and can in no 
case have more ethical justification than has the fact of ownership. The ownership 
of personal or materiel productive capacity is based upon a complex mixture of 
inheritance, luck and effort, probably in that order of relative importance. What is 
the ideal distribution from the standpoint of absolute ethics may be disputed, but of 
the three considerations named certainly none but the effort can have ethical 
validity” (1923 p.598). 
- Cobb and Douglas: “…even if there were precise correspondence, it (Edn: the 
result of their analysis) would not furnish any light upon the question as to whether 
capital for example should be privately owned to the degree to which it is in our 
society. For while capital may be “productive”, it does not follow that the capitalist 
always is” (1928 p.164). 
 
With regard to labour, the disconnect between productivity and merit is less obvious 
than for capital. However, equal opportunities never existed: Children from privileged 
backgrounds are significantly more likely to get a diploma that opens the door to better 
paying jobs. 
 
                                                          
10
 According to Clark, land is part of the capital factor. The third agent here is the entrepreneur. In 
the rest of the presentation, Clark will only consider capital and labor. 
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Marginal productivity also depends on the abundance or scarcity of a factor. While 
there are examples where scarcity can be explained by superior skill, abundance or 
scarcity are often a matter of luck, for example when they come from demographic 
factors. 
 
At a more philosophical level, it is permissible to question the merit of being born 
intelligent or strong, the two main individual qualities favourable to productivity. 
 
As Clark admitted with little conviction, science cannot distinguish merit or justice. 
 
ECONOMIC MEANING OF MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY 
Marginal productivity seems to have a mathematical significance ∂P/∂K but to have no 
ethical significance11. The next question is whether it has an economic significance. 
The usual association with the agent’s contribution to the common work, is it justified? 
Is the expression ∂P/∂K really representative of the individual contributions or is it just 
a mathematical object? 
 
A first approach is validation by contradiction from the mathematical condition. For 
marginal productivity to reflect the agent’s contribution, an obvious condition is that 
the sum of the marginal productivities of all agents of the various factors of production 
equals exactly the total product. We know that this condition is satisfied only in the 
case of constant returns to scale and provided that competition plays its role. Thus, 
marginal productivity does not reflect the contribution when returns to scale are not 
constant. The fact that the returns to scale are constant or not is random in relation to 
the meaning of individual contribution to production ;  so, if the marginal product does 
not represent the contribution in all types of returns to scale, it does not represent it in 
any of them. 
 
The other approach is more concrete.  One argument consistently advanced against the 
law is that the production process combines all inputs so indistinctly that the result is 
indecomposable. At its origin lies the thesis of "organic cooperation" put forward by 
the English heterodox economist John Atkinson Hobson who was regularly in rather 
vehement controversy with Marshall and his followers. In “The Industrial System” 
(1909), he writes: “So intimate is the interdependence of the factors upon one another, 
and of the several parts of each factor upon the other parts of its own factor and upon 
all the parts of the other factors, that no separate productivity can rightly be attributed 
to any factor, still less to any part of a factor”. (1910 p.106). 
 
If marginal productivity is reduced to the simple formula ∂P/∂K, Hobson's argument is 
not correct.  As long as the function F is differentiable, it will always be possible to 
determine, at least in theory, the variation of the production due to the last unit of the 
factor put into activity. But what if we want to charge ∂P/∂K with economic 
significance? 
 
                                                          
11
 I do not write "no normative sense", because it could be argued that marginal productivity pay 
has an incentive effect. 
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This question has the level of abstraction of metaphysical questions. In my opinion, the 
problem of the contribution belongs to this class of questions about which one can talk 
without limit but whose answer simply does not exist. 
 
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY AND REMUNERATION : EMPIRICAL ASPECT 
Before analysing the possible causes thwarting the law, let us see the results of 
empirical studies regarding the relationship between remuneration and marginal 
productivity. 
 
Studies specifically dedicated to the validation of the law 
The most famous study is that of Gottschalk (1978). He himself reminds some 
previous studies that indicated that capital was overpaid relative to its productivity and 
labour underpaid. After this reminder, he gives the results of two tests: 
A. Productivity of eight categories of workers and capital across the economy. 
So we have nine factors.  Gottschalk considers that industrial production results 
from the combination of two complementary processes: actual production and sales 
administration. The first one uses five occupations plus capital, the second six 
occupations. There are thus two mixed occupations. Both processes have a 
production function ensuring a certain substitution between the inputs; on the other 
hand, the two processes are associated in a purely complementary way. The eight 
occupations are qualified either white collar or blue collar. 
 
The methodology includes the following steps: 
1- Determination of the production functions for manufacturing and for 
administration 
2- The nine marginal revenue product functions are derived. 
3- Estimation of the production functions using cross-sectional data relating to 
manufacturing production. 
4- Calculation of marginal productivities from these estimated functions 
5- Comparison with observed wages. 
 
The double conclusion of this test is: 
o Capital received 24% of the total value added while its productivity would 
have allowed 19%. This confirms the results of previous studies. 
o The ratio of remuneration to marginal productivity varies from 2.64 for 
commercials to 0.35 for craftsmen.  In general, it is significantly higher for 
white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers, and there is an inverse 
correlation between this ratio and the productivity calculated by category. 
 
B. Internal analysis for each of the eight occupations 
Direct examination of the data relating to each occupation has the advantage of not 
requiring the specification of a production function, an operation which is always 
delicate. Here, the necessary assumption is that marginal productivities are 
proportional to average productivities. 
 
In the above conditions, “the marginal productivity theory can be tested by 
regressing earnings against average productivity, which is directly observable” 
(1978 p.376). 
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The correlation proves bad for all categories of workers except one. 
 
A more recent study is given by Kampelmann and Rycx (2011), who analysed data 
on Belgian firms between 1999 and 2006. Workers were grouped into 7 categories.  
There is a clear correlation between these categories and earnings but not between 
categories and marginal productivity.  The authors conclude: “the occupations at the 
top of the wage hierarchy (‘Managers’ and ‘Professionals’) appear to be overpaid, 
while ‘Service and Sales workers’ as well as all blue-collar occupations come out as 
being significantly underpaid with respect to their relative marginal productivities” 
(2011 p.126). 
 
Busness cycle, productivity and wage 
Giving blind faith to marginal productivity theory, Keynes, in The General Theory 
(1936), adhered to the dominant concept that real wages fluctuate contracyclically 
unlike nominal wages; it seemed logical to the economists of the time that the marginal 
productivity of labour and with it the real wage evolve in the opposite direction of 
employment. From 1938 and 1939, empirical studies have been published (Dunlop in 
Great Britain and Tarshis in the United States) which contradicted this creed. The real 
wage would be procyclical too. The clarification of Keynes in the article "Relative 
Movements of Real Wages and Output" (1939), stating that his demonstration of the 
General Theory would have been easier if these elements had been known at the time, 
is the first act of a revision of the economic theory in this matter. 
 
The behaviour of productivity over the business cycle has long been debated; it is 
generally agreed that it is procyclical. The analysis is complex because, in addition to 
unemployment, there are two types of underemployment difficult to observe and to 
measure as the factors remain within the firm: 
- The underemployment of machines 
- The phenomenon known as labour hoarding: during recessions, enterprises prefer 
to retain employees by imposing a less intensive work rather than dismissing them 
with the risk of lack of qualified arms when comes the recovery. 
 
Many recent empirical studies show that the wages of newly recruited workers are 
highly procyclical, much more than the wages of insiders. Carneiro, Guimaraes and 
Portugal write : “Exploring the idea that in the search and matching model job 
creation is driven by the difference between the expected productivity and the expected 
cost of labor in new matches, Pissarides shows that in equilibrium the wages 
negotiated in new matches are about as cyclical as productivity. This prediction of the 
model seems to be consistent with the empirical evidence that wages in new matches 
are much more procyclical than wages in continuing jobs” (2009 p.3). These new jobs 
would subsequently be subject to corrective wage variations inducing alignment with 
older contracts. Traditional neoclassical theory views the labour market as a day-to-
day market. In this case, equalisation between productivity and wages is almost 
automatic. In reality, contracts run for longer periods; the link between productivity 
and wages can be managed over the long term. Bellou and Kaymak are interested in 
this phenomenon and conclude : “This pattern of wage adjustments is consistent with a 
contractual labor market, where employers and workers partake in an implicit 
agreement to shield wage payments from fluctuations in a worker’s marginal product, 
without fully committing themselves to future payments and work. Our results, 
therefore, indicate a decoupling of the marginal product from wage payments 
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providing a potential explanation for the low elasticity of wages over the business 
cycle” (2011 p.26). 
 
ECONOMETRICS AND COBB-DOUGLAS FUNCTION 
Another way to validate the law is the one initiated by Douglas and Cobb, consisting 
in empirically testing the production function. We had seen that Douglas and Cobb 
were quite satisfied with the degree of confirmation obtained. After their 1928 article, 
with other economists, they persevered on the path traced, by improving their method 
and by applying it to other data. Since then, analyses of this type have multiplied. In 
general, the results are rather encouraging for the theory of marginal productivity. 
 
A first improvement was to drop the assumption of constant returns to scale. The α and 
β exponents both become endogenous. If the sum α+β approaches unity, it is seen as an 
additional confirmation to the results of 1928. Recognizing that “The use of time-series 
data in computing the production functions carried with it a host of technical 
problems”, Douglas explains in a retrospective article published in 1976: “The second 
important change introduced was to substitute cross-section studies of separate 
industry observations for the previous time series” (1976 p.905). 
 
In this same article, Douglas congratulates himself about the result of these studies. 
They agree on a sum α+β close to unity. In addition, the values of α and β are always 
close to the relative shares of national income that evidence grants to capital and 
labour. As another reason for satisfaction, the sector residues calculated with respect to 
α+β have the positive or negative sign where this result is expected, given the 
characteristics in terms of competition of the sector considered. 
 
The Cobb-Douglas function seems thus to be the most favourable way for empirical 
validation of the law. But these results are controversial. The disagreement here is not 
about the conformity of the calculated data with the observed data: it is indisputable. 
Critics have pointed some shortcomings of the work of Cobb and Douglas since the 
first publication in 1928. Especially, they omitted to isolate technological progress. 
P(t) = A(t).f(K,L)    (7) 
This is the first production function integrating technical progress, introduced by 
Solow in 1957. The variable A(t) captures the effect of technical progress on 
production. 
 
 On a personal note, I would add this double criticism against the statistical work of 
1928: 
- Capital input is reduced to fixed capital. The circulating capital is deliberately 
excluded. Yet interest remunerates total capital composed of both parts. 
- Labour input includes only blue collars; clerical employees are excluded, whose 
number has increased twice more, according to the authors themselves, who seem 
aware of this weakness of their analysis. 
 
It is also worth mentioning a more theoretical criticism: aggregation of microeconomic 
functions into a macroeconomic production function is valid only under very 
restrictive conditions. Franklin Fisher demonstrates this mathematically in the article 
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"The Existence of Aggregate Production Functions" (1969), but to develop this aspect 
would take us beyond our subject. 
 
Let us come to the main criticism, which denies any significance to the good 
performance of the Cobb-Douglas function in empirical tests. Its robustness could be 
explained by a reason other than coincidence between the function and the real 
economy. This argument is expressed by great economists like Phelps-Brown, Simon 
and Samuelson. The paper "The Estimation of the Cobb-Douglas Function: A 
Retrospective View” by Felipe and Adams synthesises this problem very well. 
 
Let us write the tautological identity between, on the one hand, the product-national 
income and, on the other hand, the sum of the unit wage multiplied by the amount of 
labour plus the rate of profit multiplied by the capital. This last term includes both the 
normal cost of capital and the pure profit: 
P ≡ a.L + r.K     (8) 
Let us call α’ the relative share of wages in income deduced from (8). We have 
α’ = a.L/P. 
As we have seen, from the partial derivative of the Cobb-Douglas function with 
respect to L, it comes that α = a.L/P (where a = ∂P/∂L). 
So, the α of Cobb-Douglas is similar to the α' of the accounting identity. 
 
And Felipe and Adams to conclude: “As Samuelson (1979) conjectured, this 
explanation is that all the aggregate Cobb-Douglas function regression captures is the 
path of the value added accounting identity according to which value added equals the 
sum of the wage bill plus total profits” (2005 p.430). Identity (8) can always be 
transformed into a function P = F(K,L,t). The authors add: “since what has been 
estimated is simply an identity, or a very good approximation of it, nothing can be 
inferred” (2005 p.434). Similarly, the estimates result inescapably in a sum α+β close 
to one. 
 
Reworking the data of the 1928 article, Felipe and Adams also make the surprising 
finding that the correlation of the Cobb-Douglas function with actual data worsens 
when they add the variable t to account for technical progress: β then takes negative 
values. 
 
FOR MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY TO BE DEFINED 
For the law to be valid, its central concept, marginal productivity, must be defined. The 
existence of FK supposes continuity and differentiability of the production function. 
Jumps in production resulting from the removal or addition of a factor unit are not 
allowed. Isoquants must not include linear segments forming angles because different 
isocosts could be tangent to a same point at the corner. The production function must 
provide sufficient freedom for substitution between factors, which excludes fixed 
factors, fixed proportion factors, complementary factors12. Let's look at the conditions 
for these requirements to be met. 
                                                          
12
 Pareto was in favour neither of the production function nor of the marginal productivity theory 
precisely because, in his opinion, all productions combine fixed-coefficient factors with variable-
coefficient factors and because variable coefficients are not necessarily independent amongst 
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The production function is a very flexible concept. It can be applied to a production 
process in a workshop, a factory, an enterprise that has multiple production units, a 
sector with many businesses or the economy as a whole. Similarly, a factor can be 
examined at various levels; for instance, a unit of labour could be a welder, a blue-
collar, an employee. 
 
The more general the analysis, the more the continuity of the function is plausible; the 
more it turns towards the specific, the more discontinuities are likely. If I carry out 
Cobb and Douglas's exercise that considers two factors, capital and labour, in the 
American manufacturing industry as a whole, the size of the indivisibilities remains 
minimal in relation to the volume of factors of production. On the other hand, if I am 
interested in the productivity of the various functions in a workshop, the observation 
will necessarily occur that for some of them, if I remove one unit, production stops. 
 
A conclusion emerges: the concept of marginal product seems sufficiently defined to 
determine remunerations, only in the scope of GENERAL analyses. The disadvantage is 
that general analyses can explain only general remunerations; for example the average 
remuneration of employees in France. An internal analysis inside a firm will hardly 
lead to significant results. The more the results are mathematically significant, the less 
they allow understanding wages, considering the triple heterogeneity that characterises 
labour in the real economy: of employers, of tasks and of individual qualities of 
employees. 
 
To this distinction between the general and the specific echoes a distinction between 
the long term and the short term. Consider an increase in the volume of a factor of 
production: this QUANTITATIVE variation affects output differently depending on the 
time left to the factor to reorganise itself QUALITATIVELY. With more workers, it may 
be necessary to alter the division between occupations. With more capital invested, 
technological choices need maybe to be revised. But these adjustments take time. 
 
Short-term analysis leads to a discontinuity problem. If I add a unit of a factor without 
rearranging anything, in many cases it will be of no use. If I remove one, in many 
cases the whole production will be disorganised or even stopped. Obviously, the short-
term concept is a stalemate. This is not the way how Clark conceives of marginal 
productivity. He writes: "The final increment of the capital of this railroad corporation 
is, in reality, a difference between two kinds of plants for carrying goods and 
passengers. One of these is the railroad as it stands, with all its equipment brought up 
to the highest pitch of perfection that is possible with the present resources. The other 
is the road built and equipped as it would have been if the resources had been by one 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
themselves. He gives these two examples: to produce iron, at a given technological level, the 
quantity of ore is fixed. Increasing land area of a firm does not compensate for reductions in any 
other factor. To the production function, he prefers the Walrasian-type equations: 
pa = at.pt + ap.pp + ak.pk +… (n1) 
The cost p of product A is the sum of the prices of factors t , p , k , ... weighted by the respective 
technical coefficients. Factors prices being imposed by competition, the entrepreneur minimises 
p by choosing the technical coefficients so as to have the differential of equation (n1) equal to 
zero. Pareto shows that this method is capable of handle fixed or interdependent coefficients. 
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degree less (…) the final increment of the capital of this industry is not one that can be 
physically taken out of it” (1908 p.140). 
 
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920) confirms Clark's conception. Before quoting the same 
passage from Clark's work as above, he states: “For the addition or subtraction of a 
small increment can be accomplished in several different ways with correspondingly 
different results. We are here concerned with a particular way. For us the marginal net 
product of any flow of resources employed in any use or place is equal to the 
difference between the aggregate flow of product for which that flow of resources, 
when appropriately organised, is responsible and the aggregate flow of product for 
which a flow of resources differing from that flow by a small (marginal) increment, 
when appropriately organised, would be responsible. In this statement the phrase when 
appropriately organised is essential. If we were thinking of marginal net product in the 
sense of the difference between the products of two adjacent quantities of resources, 
we should normally imagine the resources to be organised suitably to one of these 
quantities and, therefore, not to the other. Since, however, our interest is in the 
difference between the products of two adjacent flows of resources, it is natural to 
conceive each of the two flows as organised in the manner most appropriate to itself. 
This is the conception we need. It is excellently illustrated by Professor J. B. Clark”13 
(1932 pp.132-133). 
 
The difficulty is that, conceived in this way, marginal product is the difference 
between two situations that are far apart in time and not clearly identifiable. How does 
the end of the adjustment process become manifest? Having gained credibility over the 
short-run version, the long-run marginal product has lost in precision. In the "when 
appropriately organised" approach of Clark and Pigou, it is even unobservable and 
immeasurable. 
 
FIRST CONDITION OF VALIDITY : HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Let us now examine what happens when the assumptions of the theory are not 
satisfied; we begin with homogeneity of the production function. 
 
Entrepreneur, marginal productivity and residue  
In my opinion, the theory of entrepreneur and profit is one of the main stumbling 
blocks of the neoclassical economy. It is characterised by cacophony; divergences on it 
go back to the first neoclassical generation. Edgeworth devoted an interesting article 
to it in 1904, which reviews the differences of interpretation. The crux of the problem 
is to reconcile the RESIDUE tending to zero due to competition with the need for 
entrepreneurs to gain an income. 
 
Clark argues that the residue tends to zero. An innovation rewards the entrepreneur 
with a high profit. But competition shifts factors to where they are most profitable and 
increases their marginal product. Profit, evanescent, is gradually transformed into 
additional interest and wage. The existence of profit is due only to friction: “if 
                                                          
13
 Pigou refers to the Cantabridgian concept of NET marginal product (see above: Marshall and 
Robinson), in which all factors undergo an adjustment (both quantitative and qualitative). I think 
Clark stays loyal to the restrictive concept of one factor that varies while all others remain 
constant. 
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competition worked without let or hindrance, pure business profit would be annihilated 
as fast as it could be created - entrepreneur as such could never get and keep any 
income” (1908 p.219). Edgeworth contrasts this conception with that of Mangoldt, 
from whom he cites these two quotations: 
- “We must suppose the existence of undertaker’s gain (Unternehmergewinn), 
otherwise what object has the entrepreneur to increase his business?” 
- The undertaker’s remuneration is “not simply something transitory” but “a 
permanent species of income” (1925 p.25). 
 
It is common to link the entrepreneur function with risk-taking. But, as Edgeworth 
notes, “in Professor Clark’s nomenclature, this risk is borne by the capitalist”, which 
he illustrates by the quote: “Business repays men not only for their labours, but their 
fears” (1925 p.24). Clark is right. Contrary to a wide belief, pure profit (positive or 
negative - let's not forget it) is not the reward of risk but the cause of this reward, 
which takes the form of a risk premium contained in interest or even in wage or rent. 
 
In no author, is the entrepreneur so disembodied as in Walras. The product is shared 
among the many factors belonging to the three major groups: labour, land and capital. 
The entrepreneur does not earn anything if he is not himself in one of these groups. But 
Walras avoids the problem of the residue by making it impossible: its object is a 
competitive general equilibrium, of which a class of equations equalises the price of 
the product with its cost of production representing the total of the rewards. 
 
Other economists consider that the function of entrepreneur is in itself a factor of 
production, remunerated like others according to its marginal productivity. This is the 
case of Wicksteed, who like many authors, sometimes has difficulty distinguishing 
between entrepreneur and management. Within this conception, the necessary 
reconciliation between residue and marginal productivity generally leaves to be 
desired: for instance, Barone evacuates the problem of reconciliation with too much 
ease. Edgeworth cites him : “In such conditions, the law of marginal productivity 
extends to the remuneration of the entrepreneur ; and after having remunerated all the 
factors (the work of the entrepreneur included) in proportion to their marginal 
productivity (…), there remains no undistributed residue” (1925 pp.27-28). Fairly 
sceptical, Edgeworth remarks: “It is only with respect to factors of production which 
are articles of exchange that the proposed law of remuneration, the law of marginal 
productivity, is fulfilled in a regime of competition” (1925 p.28). 
 
Résidue and factor remuneration 
Let us return to Wicksell’s reasoning where we left it, when he was analysing 
remunerations in case of non-constant returns to scale. Let k be the quotient of total 
product over total factor cost. Whatever the returns to scale, equilibrium is given by 
equation (9) : 


	  =


 =	… =	  


 = k   (9) 
Where W is the remuneration of the factor in subscript. For each factor, we have14: 
WA = FA/k ; WB = FB/k ; … WN = FN/k (10) 
                                                          
14
 In fact, Wicksell considers only two factors, labour and land; capital does not intervene before 
the next chapter of the "Lectures", where it is handled in the Austrian way. 
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If k > 1, the factor's pay is less than its marginal product; if k < 1, it is higher. The 
remuneration of the factor is no longer necessarily equal to the value of the marginal 
product, but the ratio of marginal product to remuneration is still the same for all the 
factors. 
 
Profit, which will be a loss if k < 1, is equal to the sum of the marginal productivities 
of factors i minus the sum of the remunerations: 
π = ∑ 

=1  - ∑ 

=1    (11) 
It is clear that this profit is a pure residue and that it does not pay a service necessary 
for the accomplishment of the production. 
 
Who gets the profit? Marginalist theory answers: the entrepreneur. We have seen the 
vagueness about him in neoclassical theory. 
 
In my opinion, a clear understanding of the entrepreneur question involves 
distinguishing between the function and the organ. As a function, he is isolated, 
particular. But it is impossible for a person to be invested with this single function 
except any other. The undertaker is none other than one of the factors of production, 
invested with a special status. As a function, it is distinct from the factors; as an agent, 
he is one of them. Depending on the type of enterprise, the status of entrepreneur goes 
to one factor or another, possibly to several ones or to only a specific part of one of 
them. Under capitalism, this function rests most often on the shoulders of the 
shareholders, who may delegate its exercise to a single person, inside or outside the 
factor15, as the CEO. 
 
As a result, with factor K as the entrepreneur, ordinary factors’ pay is worth Fi/k 
(i = A…J,L,M,N) and that of the factor-entrepreneur is worth FK/k + π. So, the 
dividend of shareholders includes indistinctly FK and π. There is no longer a single 
proportion between factors’ remuneration and their marginal product. With profit, the 
law is inoperative. In the neoclassical theory which disembodies him, the entrepreneur 
intervenes opportunely as a deus ex machina that saves the appearances of the law. 
 
SECOND CONDITION OF VALIDITY : COMPETITION 
After returns to scale, the other fundamental assumption of the law is perfect 
competition in both the factors and product markets. Historically, this matter has 
mostly been treated by Pigou and by Robinson. Both have used the concept of labour 
exploitation to describe a situation where employees are paid below the value of their 
marginal physical product. 
 
Exploitation of labour 
Mobility of labour , Pigou explains, normally ensures the employee to get a wage up to 
his marginal product (in value). But, he adds, “In so far, however, as movements of 
workpeople are hampered by ignorance and costs, a monopolistic element is 
introduced into the wage bargain. Consequently, there is created a range of 
indeterminateness, within which the wages actually paid to any workman can be 
                                                          
15
 I consider as essential this distinction between the status of entrepreneur and the exercise of 
the function. 
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affected by individual ‘higgling and bargaining’" (1932 p.557). As stated by Pigou, if 
bargaining becomes decisive, employers are favoured because they are more 
accustomed to negotiate and because the disadvantage suffered by not hiring a worker 
is less than that of not being engaged. Collective organisation of workers can 
compensate this handicap. 
 
In the opinion of Robinson, exploitation of labour may have its origin in the 
imperfection of the product market (inelastic demand) as well as in the imperfection of 
the factor market (inelastic supply). The firm optimises its situation by hiring labour as 
long as its net marginal product covers its marginal cost. 
 
• Exploitation due to imperfections in the product market, In this case, marginal 
revenue is lower than price and therefore the net marginal product is less than the 
value of the marginal physical product. Wage, equalised with the net marginal 
product, will therefore be lower than its normal value. 
 
• Exploitation due to imperfections of the labour market. Several cases are possible, 
the simplest of which is the following: the wage paid by the firm (monopsony) 
follows a curve that increases with the number of employees hired. Marginal cost 
of labour is higher than its average cost, hence higher than wage, which therefore 
will be less than the value of marginal physical product. 
 
Robinson's conception seems dogmatic. She considers that the value of the marginal 
physical product remains the norm in an imperfectly competitive environment. As this 
rule is based on the play of perfect competition, this amounts to saying that only 
perfect competition is admissible. 
 
Monopoly rent 
When the firm is a monopolist or an oligopolist in the product market, it gets a rent in 
the form of a surplus profit. Many economists consider that the factors of production 
have potential access to it. Rent sharing is a matter of bargaining and therefore of 
power relations. It is obvious that under such conditions, our law cannot be de rigueur. 
 
Van Biesebroeck (2015) is interested in the sharing of this type of rent. It is usual to 
see sectors or firms with above-average profits paying higher wages. Kalecki is the 
first great economist to have considered this observation. The question is: « Are 
unobserved worker qualities the source of higher profits or are workers able to 
appropriate some of the profits that originate from uncompetitive product markets” 
(2015 p.19). The author mentions two studies that try to answer: 
 
- Krueger and Summers (1988) : “Even after controlling for workers observable 
and unobservable characteristics and institutional features that are likely to explain 
sectoral wage differences, such as fringe benefits, demand shocks, actual or 
threatened unionization, they find a positive association between wages and 
industry profits for equally-skilled workers” (2015 p.19). High wages are then the 
result of appropriating a part of the rent. 
 
- Gibbons and Katz (1992) study the wage consequences of job changes as a result 
of plant closings. Constancy of the wage level of the worker, when it beforehand 
included a "premium", would be an indication that his personal qualities 
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(eventually unmeasured) interfere. The conclusion of their study is mixed. The 
attribution of cross-industry wage differences to a single cause seems very 
difficult. 
 
Many studies have focused on cross-industry wage gaps. Du Caju, Rycx and Tojerow 
(2011) mention some of them, which concern various countries. The phenomenon of 
high salaries in the most profitable industries is very widespread and persistent. The 
authors analyse the data of the Belgian private sector from 1999 to 2005. Their result 
shows a considerable influence of rent-sharing but confirms that it does not explain by 
itself the whole dispersion of wages of apparently similar occupations. 
 
SOME THEORIES CONTRADICTING THE LAW 
Let us come to a few causes that invalidate the law, because they involve factors that 
the law did not take into account. This review is not intended to be exhaustive. 
 
The Austrian theory of capital 
Chronologically, the first blow came from the Austrian school. At about the same time 
as Clark deduced wage and interest of the marginal productivities associated, Böhm 
Bawerk distinguished between capital and what he called the primary factors, land 
and labour. The remunerations of the primary factors is explained by their marginal 
productivity but interest of capital is not. The interest rate is equalised with the 
marginal productivity of the lengthening of the production period. This is the famous 
formula f’(t)/f(t) already conceived by Jevons, where t is the production period and f(t) 
is the quantity produced being an increasing concave function of this period.  
 
Wicksell goes further into this idea. Capital consists in the "produced means of 
production", the best definition according to him. But, unlike land, measurable in 
hectares, and unlike labour, measurable in hours/men, capital has no inherent measure. 
Its heterogeneity is much greater than that of labour and land. The only practical 
measure is its value expressed in any kind of numeraire. But this measure is imperfect. 
Consider a situation where savings increase the value of invested capital: this results in 
an increase in the demand for labour and land and hence an increase in wages and rent. 
Precisely, wage and rent constitute the substance of circulating capital. Part of the 
increase in capital does not therefore contribute to lengthen the production process, but 
is absorbed by the increase in the cost of primary factors. The change in the value of 
capital is therefore not a good indicator of the change in physical capital. 
 
In his "Lectures on Political Economy", simplifying the problem to retain only 
circulating capital, Wicksell algebraically demonstrates that the marginal product of 
capital in value is necessarily less than interest. In a later article that includes fixed 
capital (Akerman's problem) , he comes to the conclusion that the marginal product of 
capital in value may be lower or higher than the interest. 
 
Going further in this line of thought, in the context of the capital controversy, the UK 
Cantabrigians demonstrated that the demand of capital curve which declines 
monotonically to the right, as drawn in most textbooks, is not guaranteed. Its shape, 
likely to have hollows, depends on the age structures of capital implied by the different 
technologies. Abnormal forms are more likely to occur when capital intensity differs 
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between equipment and consumer goods production, but even single-sector models 
may also exhibit this characteristic. 
 
Theories of incentive wage 
The reason why the competitive entrepreneur pays his factors of production at the 
value of their marginal product is that it leads him to maximise profit. In parallel, 
profitability also requires that wages stimulate effort. A priori, the wage determined on 
the basis of productivity satisfies this requirement. The problem is that individual 
productivity of employees is difficult to control. Wage methods that circumvent this 
difficulty may ultimately be more incentive than the productivity wage. Economists 
impute to enterprises various wage systems aimed at incentive. Let us see the two best 
known : 
 
1- The theory of efficiency wages. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) explain: “…the 
inability of employers to costlessly observe workers’ on-the-job effort can explain 
involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon. » (1984 p.433). In 
perfect Walrasian competition, involuntary unemployment never happens. 
Employers, therefore, have no way of exerting pressure on shirkers. Dismissed 
employees will immediately find a new job of equal level. Shapiro and Stiglitz’s 
idea is that employers deliberately offer a real wage higher than the one which 
clears the market. With such a wage, supply is superior to the demand, which 
implies involuntary unemployment. So, the threat of unemployment serves to 
dissuade employees of shirking16. This system is not necessarily more expensive 
than a system of permanent observation of the effort provided by each worker. 
"The equilibrium unemployment must be sufficiently large that it pays workers to 
work rather than to take the risk of being caught shirking” (Ibid). 
 
2- The theory of tournaments. This theory was first expounded in 1981 by Lazear and 
Rosen. The idea is that the salary grid based on the hierarchy of functions rewards 
the ordinal variable that is the place in the ranking of employees rather than the 
cardinal variable which are the marginal products, because it is easier to observe. 
The better salary of the higher position is designed as the incentive for lower-level 
workers to work harder in order to be selected for promotion when the position is 
vacant. Such a system tends to widen the range of wages in relation to the range of 
productivities. 
 
Lazear and Rosen conclude: « This results in paying wages which resemble prizes : 
wages which differ from realized marginal products » (1981 p.863). 
 
DOES THE LAW APPLY TO CEO REMUNERATION? 
This question is widely debated and is the subject of a lot of literature, especially in the 
United States, where there has been a striking increase in CEO compensation over the 
                                                          
16
 In another article (2001), Stiglitz identifies four reasons motivating enterprises to pay an 
efficiency wage    :  
 -           decrease staff turnover ;  
 -           attract to her the best workers ;  
 -           induce the workers to work harder (the case presented here) ;  
 -           provide the workers with the moral satisfaction of obtaining a fair wage. 
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last forty years. Shorter and Labonte observe this increase with these words : 
“According to one estimate, between 1994 and 2005, the ratio of annual median CEO 
pay to median production worker pay nearly doubled, growing from 90 to 1 to 179 to 
1. Indeed, for many workers, the perceived excessiveness of executive pay has become 
the most visible embodiment of growing pay inequality, contributing to a feeling that 
workers have not shared in the gains from economic growth. For example, adjusted for 
inflation, average worker pay rose 8% from 1995 to 2005, median CEO pay at the 350 
largest firms rose about 150% over the same period” (2007 p.2). 
 
Some economists consider that these pay gaps reflect productivity gaps between the 
agents concerned, but others are perplexed in front of these staggering figures. So was 
born a theory, called "managerial power critic". The article by Shorter and Labonte 
summarises it. I will not develop it here because the arguments are more sociological 
and legal than economic, which does not correspond to the nature of the present paper. 
The authors detail the institutional weaknesses in the corporate world that allow CEOs 
to at least partially free themselves from the control of shareholders and directors. 
 
Distributions of securities and stock options, which account for a significant portion of 
the CEO's compensation, reward their ABSOLUTE performance, which integrates 
general market growth, and not RELATIVE performance, which would take into account 
a comparison to other firms in the sector. 
 
Other studies address the problem in its economic dimension. Mayer (2018) notes 
three explanations, alternative to that of productivity: 
- The CEO market is not a competitive market. This argument is in accordance 
with the "managerial power critic". By freeing themselves from control, the 
CEO’s exercise a kind of monopoly power. 
- The CEO market is characterized by inelastic supply, for talent is scarce. A 
similarity is sometimes alluded to the case of stars of the show business. In my 
opinion, this comparison does not hold because it is precisely the notoriety of 
the stars that stimulates the sales of the entertainment industry. CEO’s activate 
sales not by their notoriety but by their skill. 
- The CEO market is characterized by inelastic demand. This is Mayer's thesis. 
He explains it  so: “A firm typically employs only one CEO. Thus, neither an 
increase nor a decrease in CEO pay may affect the number of CEOs employed. 
Accordingly, the theory of marginal productivity may not apply to CEOs” 
(2018 p.15). Two of the factors mentioned by Marshall in his analysis of 
elasticity account for this inelasticity: the absence of substitutes and the 
relatively low share of CEO remuneration in total cost, precisely because it is 
unique. 
 
This argument of inelastic demand seems to me rather convincing; it must however be 
put into perspective  owing to a counter-argument. Considering the link between price 
and marginal utility, Wicksell drew attention to a particular aspect: the independent 
variable can be either the quality level or the quantity consumed. He gives the example 
of a buyer facing three horses. Given their age, endurance and strength, the prices are 
respectively 500, 550 and 575 shillings. The buyer will choose not the quantity of 
horses but the quality of the horse so as to equalise the price and the marginal utility. 
There is an underlying variable quality level that is less observable and less objective 
than quantity but nevertheless influential. An analogous application of this principle to 
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the CEO's marginal productivity would be to rank the CEOs on the market by skill 
level and to consider that companies choose according to their budget the number of 
competence units which equalises remuneration with marginal product value. Unlike 
the number of CEO positions in the company, the competence units would be a 
continuous variable over a sufficient interval. A shortcoming of such a conception is 
the immeasurability of the decision variable. One can also doubt the ability of all firms 
to develop this ranking of potential CEOs and to appreciate precisely the adequacy 
between their qualities and the specificities of the firm. 
 
MARGINAL SOCIAL PRODUCT AND MARGINAL PRIVATE PRODUCT 
As the name suggests, marginal product is a product. The concept of product is to be 
taken in a broad sense. It includes both services and physical products, both services to 
persons (hairdressing, leisure ...) and to business (transport, storage, distribution etc.). 
This product also includes the contribution of support functions within the enterprise. 
If you cannot run a production without computers, without accounting, without 
catering, without security, these functions add value to their enterprise.  
 
Normally, labour enriches society. By adding value at the enterprise level, it increases 
the national income which is the sum of these added values. In parallel to this very 
common form of productive occupations, some functions add value to their enterprise, 
but entirely or partially to the detriment of competing firms or other economic agents. 
Let's mention three examples: 
 -           CEO’s, executives  
 -           Lawyers  
 -           Advertising agencies 
Let us look at this particular type of productivity in the case of CEOs. To a large 
extent, TOTAL demand on the market for its product is exogenous to the action of the 
firm, so it is rather on the market SHARE that it will act to maximise the sales volume. 
To succeed, the firm counts on the qualities of its CEO. The more efficient he is, the 
lower competitors’ sales will be. Possibly, the employees may be another losing group, 
because the efficient CEO could get more out of his employees than competitors while 
paying the same remuneration. 
 
The work of the CEO is of a special nature. Efficiency of other functions is absolute 
and not only relative, while, to a certain extent, the CEO is inefficient if he is less 
efficient than the CEOs of competing companies. 
 
The case of advertisers is quite similar. Advertising is effective only if it is more 
convincing than that of competitors, in which case, ceteris paribus, it increases the 
market share of the firm at their expense. 
 
The present argument distinguishing the functions that handle profits and those that 
produce is simply a consequence of the fact that competition is the mode of 
organisation of the economy. 
 
What most matters in this distinction is its relation to the distribution of income. It is 
not surprising that a company is more motivated to pay well for functions perceived as 
having a more direct impact on its profit. Gaining one or two percent of market share 
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will appreciably enhance the shareholders’ s position. It would be difficult for the men 
behind the scene to achieve an equally profitable result. 
 
An interpretative framework of this problem is offered by the welfare economics of 
Pigou, more precisely the distinction between the marginal PRIVATE net product and 
the marginal SOCIAL net product. He explains: “For complete accuracy it is necessary 
to distinguish between two senses in which the term marginal increment of resources 
may be employed. It may be conceived either as being added, so to speak, from 
outside, thus constituting a net addition to the sum total of resources in existence, or as 
being transferred to the particular use or place we are studying from some other use or 
place (1932 p.131) The marginal social net product is the total net product of physical 
things or objective services due to the marginal increment of resources in any given 
use or place, no matter to whom any part of this product may accrue (p.132) The 
marginal private net product is that part of the total net product of physical things or 
objective services due to the marginal increment of resources in any given use or place 
which accrues in the first instance- i.e. prior to sale-to the person responsible for 
investing resources there” (p.134). In normal situations, both types of marginal product 
coincide. 
 
Suppose that all the other difficulties about the marginal productivity concept are 
resolved. It could then be said that the CEO’s labour has a positive and high marginal 
private product, but that his marginal social product is significantly less (but certainly 
not zero). 
 
Which of the two marginal products, the private or the social, is to be considered as the 
agent’s CONTRIBUTION? Here is one more difficulty related to the concept of 
contribution17. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The law of retribution according to marginal product arouses doubt or even suspicion; 
some find it easy to see through in order to justify the existing distribution of income.  
 
The most dazzling enrichments are often the case of great innovators. These 
innovations, which cannot be copied for legal or other reasons, are incompatible with 
perfect competition. The innovative firm that pays its factors at their marginal 
productivity then benefits from a significant residue that takes the form of a profit 
accruing to the entrepreneur-innovator. It must not be expected that marginal 
productivity explains the whole of the question. 
 
                                                          
17
 After having written this section, I found the article by Gottschalk and Tinbergen (1982), which 
relates Tinbergen’s theory of counterproductivity. Here are a few citations: “… concept of 
counterproductivity which suggests that marginal revenue products may not be a useful concept 
for setting the wages of certain types of labour. Counterproductivity is the phenomenon that it is 
some individuals’ task to partly or wholly destroy somebody else’s product (…) the total 
productivity of all the sales workers of firms A and B is small. The same applies to their marginal 
productivity. Does this mean that these workers should be paid almost no income? Not at all: 
their social function is to maintain a competitive system, which produces significantly more than 
a monopolistic system, where all product groups are monopolized” (p.332). 
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Empirical studies do not seem to support the law. Their reliability is however 
questionable, because unlike average productivity, marginal productivity, an abstract 
concept, is not directly observable. No time series will ever show the extra output due 
to the marginal increase of one factor when all others remain constant. As for the 
estimation of the production function, the approach seems optimistic; the difficulties 
are numerous: human capital, technical progress per se, incorporation of a part of 
technical progress… 
 
We have identified a number of specific aspects of economic reality that may either 
impede the determinateness of marginal product or divert earnings from this norm: 
 
- The delay inherent in the marginal product if it is conceived in the Clark-Pigou 
way implying optimal adaptation of technology to the quantitative variation of the 
factor. 
- The indivisibilities that make the production function non differentiable if the 
analysis relates to microeconomic entities 
- The existence of rents due to monopoly or imperfect competition, gained by the 
factor-entrepreneur which he eventually shares with other factors as a result of 
bargaining 
- Dominant positions in the factors markets 
- Non-constant returns to scale that generate a profit or a loss that affects the 
remuneration of the factor-entrepreneur 
- The doubt induced by the Austrian theory of capital that interest equals marginal 
productivity of capital 
- Business practices in human resources management, including efficiency wages 
and tournaments 
- The sensitivity of the recruitment wage to the business cycle, higher than that of 
the current wage. Both cannot be equal to the marginal productivity of labour 
- The significant gap between private and social marginal productivity that 
characterises several important functions. 
 
In itself, like many laws of economics, the one explaining retribution by marginal 
productivity results from an impeccable logical reasoning. But this logic handles very 
few variables in comparison to the complexity of the real economy. And its 
assumptions are quite restrictive. 
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